Postwar Compilations on the History of Governing by the Japanese Ruling Elites of Colonial Korea: The Case of Yūhō Kyōkai by Lee, Hyoung-sik
Postwar Compilations on the History of 
Governing by the Japanese Ruling Elites of 
Colonial Korea: The Case of Yūhō Kyōkai
LEE Hyoung-sik*
Abstract | Postwar Japanese society sought to erase the memories of the nation’s colonial 
past after its defeat in the Asia-Pacific War. As colonial legacies lingered, however, 
including the problem of Korean residents in Japan and the outbreak of the Korean 
War, the so-called “Korea problem” (Chōsen mondai) emerged to the fore of Japanese 
society. It was against this backdrop that the former ruling elites of the colonial era 
organized into Yūhō Kyōkai (Friendly Nation Association) with the support of 
repatriated Japanese corporations and Korea-related firms. As the Fatherland Defense 
Corps of the League of Koreans in Japan (Choryŏn) sought to expand their influence 
after the outbreak of the Korean War, Japanese newspapers and magazines became 
fierce political battlegrounds on the issues of Korean residents and Japan’s colonial rule 
over Korea. Right-leaning newspapers and magazines began to publish malicious 
reports on Koreans in Japan, outwardly expressing their contempt and discrimination 
against them. In response, the leftist literary circles, composed of Korean residents, 
members of the New Japanese Literary Society, some conscientious Japanese and 
progressive intellectuals, and journalists began to criticize this approach to the problem. 
With this overall shift away from prewar militarism towards a “cultural” and “pacifist” 
Japan, the former officials of the Government General of Korea, who kept a relatively 
low profile under the US occupation’s censorship in postwar Japanese society, began to 
challenge the “collective memory” of oppression and exploitation constructed by the 
“colonized.” Instead, they disseminated their own memory of development and progress 
brought to Korea during colonial rule. With the support of Japan’s economic circles, 
including the Japan-Korean Economic Association, Yūhō Kyōkai established historical 
archives on the colonial era (Yūhō Collection, Historical Records on the Rule over 
Korea, Yūhō Series, etc.) in order to  “historicize” the collective memories of “colonizers.” 
For the former officials of the Government General of Korea, the final agreement 
reached in 1965 for Korea-Japan normalization acted as a “seal” or a settlement of the 
issues surrounding Japan’s responsibilities for colonizing Korea. With this occasion and 
Japan’s rapid economic growth at the time, these “collective memories” of former 
colonial officials came to evolve into “public memories,” significantly influencing Japan’s 
postwar conception of the colonial era.
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Introduction 
In postwar Japanese society, the problems of the nation’s colonial past remained 
buried in oblivion. Yet, the Japanese repatriates who returned home at the end 
of the war and Koreans remaining in Japan (Zainichi Koreans) who directly 
experienced the colonial period brought the issues to the fore. The Japanese 
repatriates, however, were not well received by Japanese society, as they were 
criticized from both ends of the political spectrum. The left condemned them as 
the “major culprits of aggression,” while the right treated them as a “nuisance” to 
Japan’s already-strained job market and tight food supply (Yi Yeon-Sik 2012). 
Responding to such denunciations, the former ruling elites of colonial 
Korea, including the returned Japanese officials of the Government General of 
Korea (hereafter GGK),1 organized into Yūhō Kyōkai (Friendly Nation 
Association) in 1952, in order to collect, organize, and publish relevant materials 
on their colonial rule. In the form of archives (Yūhō Collection [Yūhō Bunko]) 
and professional historiography (Historical Survey of Japanese Overseas 
Activities, Yūhō series, audio records, etc.), they sought to visualize and 
disseminate their collective memories of the colonial past to Japanese society in 
the postwar era.2 
The studies on the experiences and memories of the former officials of the 
GGK are invaluable in understanding Japan’s relations with East Asian 
countries, as well as Japan’s overall perception of East Asia in the postwar era, 
which are critical in bridging the historical gap between Korea and Japan.3 Yet, 
given the diversity of the Japanese repatriates, varying by occupation, age, 
gender, and geographic location, it is difficult to generalize their experiences 
and memories. Nonetheless, if we consider that individual memories are also 
social constructs, memories are both the outcome and the foundation of the 
1. In this paper, “ruling elites of colonial Korea” refers to Japanese officials of the GGK, Bank of 
Korea, Industrial Bank of Korea (Shokusan Ginkō), Oriental Development Company, Keijō Daily 
News (Keijō nippō) Keijō Imperial University, who were involved in the colonial rule of Korea. 
2. On collective memory, refer to Olick (2011).
3. Kajimura’s (1992) work pioneered the question of “how the discriminative preconceptions 
forged in the prewar era transcended and reproduced over time.”
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group’s identity (Halbwachs 1992). On the grounds that a diverse array of 
“collective memories” coexisted in postwar Japanese society, and that these 
memories gradually converged into forming Japan’s “official memory” of its 
colonial rule, this article focuses on the Yūhō Kyōkai. This group provides an 
empirical lens through which to understand Japanese ruling elites’ perceptions 
and memories of the colonial era.
Despite the merits of the research, the number of studies addressing the 
activities and colonial consciousness of Japanese ruling elites remains small. 
Chŏng Pyŏng-uk (2005), for instance, focused on the Central Japanese-Korean 
Association (Chūō Nit-Kan Kyōkai) in analyzing the Korea-Japan Talks. Rho Ki 
Young (2006) studied the Assimilation Association (Dōwa Kyōkai) and Central 
Japanese-Korean Association, which were organized by Japanese repatriates 
from colonial Korea. Apart from the above literature, the work by Miyata 
Setsuko (2000) only provides a brief overview of the Yūhō Kyōkai. The main 
limitations of these studies are that they restrict their scope of research to a basic 
overview of the Yūhō Kyōkai—particularly its membership—in the context of 
Korea-Japan normalization talks. They do not address the foundational 
questions of why the Yūhō Kyōkai was established in the first place, how their 
members and financial structures were organized, or what specific activities the 
association actually did. 
To fill in such gaps in the literature, this article sets up the following research 
agenda. First, it explores how and in what context Japanese ruling elites of the 
colonial era established the Yūhō Kyōkai. Second, the personnel and financial 
structure of the organization will be examined. Lastly, this article delves into 
why these past ruling elites sought to compile their history of ruling colonial 
Korea and how these compilations were prepared and published in the historical 
context of postwar Japanese society. 
The materials analyzed in this research include newspapers from the time, 
magazines, memoirs, the audio record collection at Gakushūin University, and 
Yūhō Kyōkai’s internal documents and bulletins (Yūhō Monthly, Yūhō Kyōkai 
Newsletter), as well as the personal documents of the association’s executive 
members (Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents),4 which remain underutilized in 
4. Kimijima Ichirō (1887-1975) was born in 1887 in Tochigi Prefecture and attended the First High 
School (Ikkō). Upon his graduation from Tokyo Imperial University in 1912, Kimijima joined 
Bank of Japan. Starting from the Osaka branch office, Kimijima worked his way up a series of key 
posts in the Bank of Japan, including Okayama branch manager, Moji branch manager, treasurer, 
and director of Document Management (inaugurated in 1936), until his retirement in 1940. After 
his retirement, Kimijima served as vice president of the Bank of Korea, as well as chairman of the 
Central Korea Association from 1940 to 1945. In the postwar years, he served as chairman of the 
Central Japanese-Korean Association, Japan-Korea Fraternal Association, and Yūhō Kyōkai. When 
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other research. The Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents (Kimijiam Ichirō kankei 
bunsho)5 are especially key primary materials in this research to vividly restore 
the internal affairs of Yūhō Kyōkai and the voices of Japanese ruling elites of the 
colonial era, which remained largely inaccessible and unstudied to this date. 
The Founding of Yūhō Kyōkai 
1. Background
Why was Yūhō Kyōkai established? This question remains unanswered since its 
founding in October 1952. Another untouched area of study is the close 
correlation between the founding of Yūhō Kyōkai and the issues at the time 
surrounding Korean residents in Japan. To illustrate how these issues of Korean 
residents formed the background of the incipient phase of Yūhō Kyōkai, this 
section will analyze The Guidelines on the Establishment of Yūhō Kyōkai 
(Zaidanhōjin Yūhō Kyōkai setsuritsu yōkō, n.d.).6 
The nationwide association of Korean residents in Japan, officially named 
the League of Koreans in Japan (Chae-Ilbon Chosŏnin Yŏnmaeng, hereafter 
Choryŏn), was founded in October 1945. As the representative group of Koreans 
liberated from Japan’s colonial rule, Choryŏn took over the buildings and 
financial assets of the GGK branch offices and Bank of Korea in Japan when 
Korea was finally liberated in 1945. Choryŏn also secured enormous amounts of 
money from Koreans in exchange for mediating their return to Korea and 
receiving deposits and bonds left by these repatriates. They also accrued funds 
by withdrawing unpaid wages and compensation for Koreans conscripted 
during the colonial era from the Japanese government and corporations. Based 
on these abundant financial resources, Choryŏn rapidly expanded their scope of 
influence by providing support for repatriating Koreans, offering humanitarian 
relief to Koreans living in flood-stricken regions, supporting Korean residents in 
the black market, and undertaking education and cultural programs that sought 
to improve the lives of these Korean residents (O Kyu-sang 2009; Mizuno and 
Mun Kyŏng-su 2015). 
Yūhō Kyōkai president, Hozumi Shinrokurō, passed away in 1970, Kimijima succeeded him as the 
next president of Yūhō Kyōkai, serving until his death in 1975. 
5. The documents are stored in the Faculty of Law Center for Modern Japanese Legal and Political 
Documents, the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics.
6. It is an unpublished document stored at the Yūhō Collection. The author and the year of 
creation are unknown.
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However, Choryŏn’s rapid expansion was soon interrupted by 1947 when the 
General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
(hereafter GHQ) shifted its occupation policy. Unlike the initial treatment of 
Korean residents in Japan as “liberated Koreans” from Japan’s colonial rule, the 
new policy placed these Korean residents under the jurisdiction of the Japanese 
government and made their schools follow the guidelines of the Japanese 
Ministry of Education. Further departing from the prewar period, the GHQ and 
Japanese government disfranchised the Korean residents and enacted an alien 
registration system. They also began repressing Choryŏn’s “national education” 
programs by closing down Korean schools in Japan. In response, Choryŏn 
implemented an aggressive protest movement against such suppression, as 
shown in the case of Choryŏn’s Hanshin Education Struggle. 
Designating Choryŏn as a violent group, the GHQ and Japanese government 
(under the directives of the GHQ) disbanded Choryŏn in September 1949 and 
confiscated all their assets. Twenty-eight executive members of Choryŏn and the 
Democratic League of Korean Youth in Japan (Zainichi Chōsen Minshu Seinen 
Dōmei) were also removed from public offices. Choryŏn’s youth academies and 
high schools, located across Japan to foster the younger generations’ activities, 
were forcefully closed down after October 1949 (Chŏng Yŏng-hwan 2013, 277-
78).7 With the ostensible reason for arresting criminals of robbery and theft, the 
police also raided eighty-one Zainichi villages in Japan around the Kantō region. 
As Choryŏn’s financial provisions had been foundational to the lives of Korean 
residents in Japan, this suppression of Choryŏn quickly deteriorated their living 
standard. The confrontation between Choryŏn and the GHQ was exacerbated as 
the Choryŏn activists further responded with counter activities, such as 
protesting against the residence tax, providing relief for Koreans in Japan, 
implementing campaigns against registering in the Japanese educational system, 
advocating Korean schools and their national education, and demanding the 
release of imprisoned Koreans. Highlighting the collisions between GHQ and 
Korean residents in Japan, Japan’s mainstream media often expressed concern, 
urging restraint and self-reflection from Korean residents (“Shasetsu: zairyū 
Chōsenjin,” 1949; “Chōsenjin ni nozomu,” 1949; “Shasetsu: chian ni taisuru,” 
1950). 
The Japanese government, while suppressing Choryŏn’s human rights 
advocacy and democratization movements, dissolved Choryŏn on November 10, 
1949 and declared in the cabinet that the confiscated assets from Choryŏn would 
7. The public offices here include not just the positions in the government, but also the executive 
positions in the private sector, associations, and labor unions. 
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be used for the welfare of Korean residents in Japan. On January 4, 1950, 
Attorney General Ōhashi Takeo announced that “a considerable amount of 
resources [withdrawn from Choryŏn] will be allocated immediately to be spent 
on the education and welfare of Korean residents in Japan” (Suzuki 1968, 74). 
Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 was the 
momentum to make the “Korea problem” the top issue in Japan. As economic 
analyst Koyama Setsuo (1950a, 1950b) described, the Korean War was “welcome 
rain” to the persistent “drought” in Japan’s industry at the time. The Korean War 
propelled an economic boom in Japan—namely the “Korea boom” or Korean 
War special procurements—as Japan became the major supplier of military 
materials to the UN forces, primarily composed of the US Army. 
The Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Choryŏn regarded the Korean 
War as US imperialist aggression against the Korean Peninsula and illegally 
organized their own Fatherland Defense Committee and Defense Corps to 
impede the production and transportation of Japan’s military goods and 
instigate strikes among the laborers in the munitions factories (Pak Kyŏng-sik 
1989, 32). Many were arrested in November 1950 in the Kobe region, when 
Choryŏn came into direct conflict with the police forces during their protests 
against the residence tax and the removal of Choryŏn members from public 
offices, and their efforts to improve the lives of Korean residents. As similar 
confrontations escalated in other areas, right-wing news outlets, such as the 
Yomiuri Newspaper and Jiji Newspaper, referred to these incidents as “riots.” This 
raised suspicions on the connections between the riots and the Japanese 
Communist Party, thereby urging countermeasures by the Japanese government 
(“Kōbe ni sengo,” 1950; “Shasetsu: Kansai no Chōsenjin,” 1950; “Shasetsu: 
Higashi Nihon,” 1950; “Shasetsu: zenryō na Chōsenjin,” 1950).8 At a press 
conference on December 28, 1950, Prime Minister Yoshida announced that 
heavy punishments would be imposed on Korean residents for acts of 
aggression against public order. The chief cabinet secretary also stated that firm 
actions would be taken to reflect the law and that the government was also 
deliberating various measures, including deportation.
Under the circumstances, in June 1951, former GGK director of the Bureau 
of Industry (Shokusankyokuchō) and Vice President of the Assimilation 
Association Hozumi Shinrokurō9 stated in the “Statement of Purpose of Yūhō 
8. Despite some differences in the tone of the articles, the era’s influential news outlets in Japan, 
including Asahi Newspaper, Mainichi Newspaper, and Tokyo Newspaper, expressed concern over 
“the riots involving Korean residents in Japan.” 
9. Hozumi Shinrokurō was born in 1889, the fourth son of Hozumi Nobushige, in the faculty of 
law at Tokyo Imperial University. After graduating from the Department of Law, majoring in 
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Kyōkai” that “the Korean issues are most important and grave in Japan.” In his 
presumption, “most of the Korean residents in Japan are potential advocates of 
communism.” He argued that “their uprising in Japan would be inevitable, 
should the communist forces intrude into Japan from the north” (Zaidanhōjin 
Yūhō Kyōkai setsuritsu yōkō, n.d.). In this way, he expressed his concern over the 
possibility of a communized Korean Peninsula and therefore an urgent need for 
comprehensive measures on the Korea problem. 
As illustrated, the emerging problems of Korean residents in Japan and the 
outbreak of the Korean War brought the “Korea problem” to the fore of postwar 
Japanese society. In this backdrop, the former ruling elites of the colonial era 
realized the need to establish Yūhō Kyōkai to deal with the problem.
2. Preparations
Initially, these repatriated GGK officials sought to compile their thirty-six year 
histories of governing via the Old Friends’ Club (Kyūyū Kurabu, formerly 
Central Korea Association).10 However, as the budget shortage made the attempt 
unrealistic, Hozumi Shinrokurō, in the autumn of 1950, began to plan for the 
founding of an institution, the Korea Research Institute (Chōsen Kenkyūjo). This 
institution would research, analyze, and disseminate their findings on Korean 
issues with the members of the Assimilation Association,11 Suzuki Takeo 
(former professor at Keijō Imperial University), Funada Kyōji (former professor 
of Keijō Imperial University), Odaka Tomoo (former professor of Keijō Imperial 
political science, at Tokyo Imperial University in 1913, Hozumi passed the public service 
examination and joined the GGK. Hozumi assumed a series of key posts in the treasury and 
foreign affairs sections. In the years between 1932 and 1941, Hozumi served as the director of the 
Bureau of Industry. After retirement, he became president of the Korea Promotion of Industry Co., 
Ltd (Chōsen Kōgyō) and was inaugurated as head of the Korean Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry in 1942. In the postwar years, he served as the vice-chairman of the National Federation 
of Repatriate Groups and was elected in the House of Councilors in 1947. Later, he also held major 
posts in Korea-related organizations, such as vice president of the Assimilation Association and 
chairman of Yūhō Kyōkai (1952-70).
10. The Central Korea Association was founded in 1926 in Tokyo by the former high-level officials 
of the GGK. On prewar Central Korea Association, refer to Lee Hyoung-sik (2007). 
11. The Assimilation Association was established in July 1947 among Japanese repatriates from 
colonial Korea. It brought together the Korea Business Council (established in November 1945 to 
compensate overseas businesses and assets), the Old Friends’ Club (formerly Central Korea 
Association, established in February 1946), and the Relief Society of Compatriots Repatriated from 
Korea (established in March 1946). In November 1952, shifting away from the association’s initial 
focus as a group for Japanese repatriates, the association changed its name to the Central Japanese-
Korean Association. Many executive members of Yūhō Kyōkai, such as Hozumi and Shibuya, also 
served as executives to the Assimilation Association. 
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University), Kubota Yutaka (former CEO of Korea Power), Shibuya Reiji 
(former chief of Investigation Division of Bank of Korea), Zenshō Eisuke 
(former non-regular staff member of the GGK) and others (Lee Hyoung-sik 
2011, 264; Zaidanhōjin Yūhō Kyōkai setsuritsu yōkō, n.d.). At the outset, this 
Korea Research Institute planned to be a subsidiary organization to the 
Assimilation Association, which was composed of Japanese repatriates. It would 
have support from the Immigration Bureau, national police, Ministry of Justice, 
and other government agencies and ministries, and accrue a sum of two-million 
yen from major banks and corporations (Shibuya Reji’s Letter to Kimijima 
Ichirō, November 29, 1950, Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents).
It was around this time—at the end of 1950—when the Ministry of Justice 
delivered their intention, via Shibuya Reiji,12 to the former Japanese ruling elites 
of colonial Korea that the government was willing to allocate fifteen million out 
of 160 million yen confiscated from Choryŏn to launch welfare programs for 
Korean residents in Japan. Initially, these colonial ruling elites debated among 
themselves whether or not to accept the offered amount, and the majority of the 
voices opposed settling on the offer. 
The ruling elites’ main points of contention were: (1) The complicated nature 
of the funds limited efficient usage of these resources to fulfill their goals; (2) 
The assigned amount would be insufficient to provide the necessary welfare to 
600,000 Korean residents in Japan; (3) Successful welfare programs for Korean 
residents in Japan remained unprecedented since the GGK period. 
Those who agreed to the proposed sum argued that: (1) the Korea problem is 
becoming an internationally significant issue that can no longer be neglected; 
(2) the establishment of a more comprehensive state apparatus is becoming 
indispensable to govern these Korean residents; and (3) this opportunity would 
bring knowledgeable experts on Korean resident issues and their “unique 
characteristics” to the process.
Understanding the gravity of this offer, the repatriated ruling elites of 
colonial Korea deliberated the matter with the key figures of the Assimilation 
Association, such as President Tanaka Takeo, Advisor Maruyama Tsurukichi 
(former director of the Police Affairs Bureau at the GGK), and Ikeda Kiyoshi 
(also a former director of the Police Affairs Bureau at the GGK) (Yūhō geppō 
1951). As a result, they agreed that a request for a large sum of government 
12. Shibuya was born in 1877 in Hokkaido. Graduating from Waseda University in 1905, he was 
invited to join the Korean government as an advisor in 1907. Shibuya remained in his post after 
Japan’s annexation of Korea and worked as head of financial affairs in North Hamgyŏng Province. 
After retirement in 1916, he assumed a series of high-level posts in the Bank of Korea as well as in 
the Korea Trade Association. 
 Postwar Compilations on the History of Governing by the Japanese Ruling Elites  135
subsidies should be made and that the Assimilation Association should fully 
cooperate in the founding of a new organization, the Korea Research Institute, 
to deal with Korean resident problems. With numerous follow-up deliberations 
with relevant experts, they finally came to the decisions that 1) the newly 
establishing organization should attend to the original goals—to research and 
analyze the problems surrounding Korean residents in Japan; and 2) they should 
accept the proposed budget from the Ministry of Justice and use the funds to 
provide welfare programs for Korean residents. To perform these two tasks, they 
also reached a consensus to found the institution with a new name, Yūhō 
Kyōkai, rather than the previously posed Korea Research Institute. In the end, 
however, Hozumi declined to accept the proposed funds from the Ministry of 
Justice on the grounds that it was not desirable to run Korea-related programs 
with such confiscated assets from Choryŏn. Instead, he decided to establish an 
independent institution that specialized in collecting, studying, and disseminating 
materials on the past colonial rule of Korea (Yūhō Collection Recording, 
February 23, 1964).13 In other words, with Hozumi’s refusal to accept Choryŏn’s 
assets, the welfare related issues for Korean residents in Japan became secondary 
to the priorities of the newly established Yūhō Kyōkai. 
Contrary to Hozumi’s claims, the evidence reveals that the Assimilation 
Association did not fully agree with his approach to set up an independent 
institution outside of the Assimilation Association: “Setting up an independent 
institution may be justifiable if the purpose is to pursue a purely academic 
approach on Korean issues, like the Academic Association of Koreanology in 
Japan (Chōsen Gakkai). However, as the listed aim of (establishing) Yūhō Kyōkai 
is to solve and study the era of colonial Korea and Korean resident problems in 
Japan, (without founding a separate association), these programs can be 
(consistently) implemented as part of the Assimilation Association” (Hozumi 
1952). 
In response, Hozumi argued that it would be inappropriate for the 
Assimilation Association to act as the sole institution to deal with all Korean 
issues, and that a separate organization would be indispensable for research on 
the era of colonial Korea and mediating Korea-Japan talks. His main argument 
was that the Assimilation Association had negative reputation to address 
colonial issues, for it was composed of too many former officials of the GGK 
(Yūhō Collection Recording, February 23, 1964). There were also issues 
13. The confiscated assets from Choryŏn by the Japanese Ministry of Justice were relocated to 
general accounting after April 1953, instead of the initial intention to spend it on Zainichi Korean’s 
welfare programs. 
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surrounding President Tanaka’s use of the Assimilation Association funds.14 
Henceforth, Yūhō Kyōkai was in charge of collecting, researching, and compiling 
data on their past rule over colonial Korea. The Central Japanese-Korean 
Association, succeeding the Assimilation Association, managed “Korea-Japan 
relations, cultural exchange, and economic partnership” as normalization talks 
began between Korea and Japan, alleviating the association’s initial stigma as an 
organization of Japanese repatriates from Korea. Regardless, these two 
organizations were occasionally at odds with each other.15
At the end of January 1951, in consultation with the Ministry of Justice, Yūhō 
Kyōkai obtained approval from the GHQ via the Ministry of Justice to establish 
regulations for “donations.” In April of the same year, Hozumi codified the 
institutional structure of Yūhō Kyōkai and submitted a proposal entitled The 
Guidelines on the Establishment of Yūhō Kyōkai to the government. This 
proposal founded the Institute for South Korean Studies (Kankoku Chōsa 
Kenkyūjo), Japan-Korea Discussion Meeting (Nit-Kan Konwakai), Korea 
Cooperation Committee (Tai-Kankoku Kyōryoku Iinkai), and Committee for 
Health and Welfare of Korean Residents in Japan (Zainichi Kankokujin Kōsei 
Fukushi Iinkai) under the jurisdiction of the Yūhō Kyōkai. With the finalization 
of the plan in June, Hozumi aimed to raise about two-million yen in funds, 
utilizing Shibuya’s connections as former section chief of the Bank of Korea and 
chairman of the Korea Trade Association.
Founding members of Yūhō Kyōkai included Hozumi, Ogata Taketora, Ikeda 
Kiyoshi, Hayashi Shigeki, Kubota Yutaka, Shibuya, and others. Serving as 
cabinet secretary, Ogata delivered information on the internal affairs of Yūhō 
Kyōkai to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and lobbied for his support. From 
December 1951, serious fundraising, nationwide discussions, and committee 
meetings on Korean issues commenced. On December 6, for instance, 
committee meetings were held at the Fukuoka Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. The participants included founding members of Yūhō Kyōkai, 
including Hozumi, Shibuya, Kondō Ken’ichi, and Ogata, as well as Fukuoka 
Governor Sugimoto Katsuji, Fukuoka Mayor Konishi Haruo, President of 
14. President Tanaka was found to have used the funds of the Assimilation Association (about 
thirty-million yen) to run for the House of Councilors election in 1953 (Tasaka 1986). 
15. Although Miyata Setsuko (2000) stated in her work that Yūhō Kyōkai closely collaborated with 
the Central Japanese-Korean Association, they seemed to disagree at times. Director of the 
Assimilation Association Harada Dairoku, for instance, opposed the founding of Yūhō Kyōkai and 
thereby refused to let their members’ names to be used in the process. He also collected utility fees 
from Yūhō Kyōkai, which used the same offices as the Assimilation Association (Kōtaki Motoi’s 
Letter to Kimijima Ichirō, March 21, 1973, Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents).
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Fukuoka Chamber of Commerce and Industry Yamawaki Masatsugu, and other 
influential figures in Fukuoka’s political and economic circles. As a result, they 
raised a total of 640,000 yen, mainly from companies returning to Kyushu from 
Korea. According to Shibuya’s letter to the former vice president of the Bank of 
Korea Kimijima Ichirō, sent on June 6, 1952, the process of founding Yūhō 
Kyōkai was as follows: 
To establish Yūhō Kyōkai, I have been accompanying Mr. Hozumi since last year, 
arranging several meetings in various places with the help of Fukuoka Mayor 
Konishi. Many people have responded quite positively to our initiatives. In 
February and during these three occasions, we were able to raise around 600,000 
yen. Also, during a meeting of twenty Korea-related Japanese repatriates, held in 
late May in Osaka, we achieved much more than we expected. I am planning to 
go back to Osaka on the ninth to finalize the discussions and return to Tokyo on 
the fifteenth. Following [the discussions on the founding of the association] last 
year, we plan to hold an inaugural meeting after fundraising one-million yen or 
more, getting permission to establish the foundation in Tokyo, and seriously 
beginning our activities. Through Matsumoto Kenjirō, Mr. Hozumi and I are 
seeking contributions from the five largest conglomerates, namely Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Furukawa, Sumitomo, and Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship (Hokkaidō 
Tankō Kisen). When we finish establishing the association, we would also like to 
ask for your help. As I mentioned earlier, since Mr. Hozumi is not good with 
communications, we sought to invite Mr. Shibusawa Keizō [for the presidency]. 
Yet, as Mr. Shibusawa continues to refuse, we decided to endorse Shimomura 
Hiroshi on the recommendation by Ogata Taketora. Mr. Shimomura has already 
consented. Furthermore, we are planning to consolidate Yūhō Kyōkai and the 
Assimilation Association later. (Shibuya Reiji’s Letter to Kimijima Ichirō, June 6, 
1952, Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents)
Four things can be inferred from this letter. First, Fukuoka Mayor Konishi 
Haruo played a central role as an active supporter to the founding of Yūhō 
Kyōkai. Second, they sought to raise funds from the five major conglomerates, 
including Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship,16 which were 
closely involved in colonial Korea with the help of Matsumoto Kenjirō who 
served as president of Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) at the time. Third, 
they endorsed Shimomura Hiroshi as the first president of the association, 
which Shimomura had already accepted. Fourth, they planned to consolidate 
the Assimilation Association and Yūhō Kyōkai in the foreseeable time. Shibuya’s 
idea to consolidate the two groups is especially noteworthy, as it reveals his 
differences from Hozumi, who wanted independent operation for Yūhō Kyōkai. 
16. Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship was a representative coal mining company in the Hokkaido 
region, where a large number of mobilized Koreans were placed to work in coal production. 
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Given their disparate views, Shibuya and Hozumi did not always communicate 
well with each other when promoting Shimomura as the first president of Yūhō 
Kyōkai. 
Meanwhile, Hozumi and Shibuya also consulted with Kimijima, who had 
influential connections in political and economic circles (Kimijima Ichirō’s 
Diary, June 28, 1952, Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents). They were able to 
receive 300,000 yen from the Bank of Japan and 30,000 yen each from the Asahi 
Newspaper and Mainichi Newspaper. Yet, given Japan’s recession at the time and 
growing antipathy towards Korean residents in Japan, the contributed amount 
fell far below the expected amount. After holding the inaugural meeting on 
August 30, Hozumi and Shibuya stopped by Tokyo on September 19 to apply for 
permission to be established in Tokyo at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With 
the help of Cabinet Secretary Ogata, they received final approval on October 4. 
As illustrated in the case of former Bank of Korea vice president Kimijima, 
former Bank of Korea section chief Shibuya, and former Bank of Korea branch 
manager in Dalian Konishi, the process of tracing Yūhō Kyōkai’s incipient phase 
reveals how connections to former Bank of Korea personnel played a critical 
role in its establishment. The question arises as to why former executives of the 
Bank of Korea became involved in the founding of Yūhō Kyōkai. According to 
Shibuya’s letter to Kimijima, sent on November 29, 1950, Kimijima proposed a 
plan to use the six-billion yen located in the Bank of Korea to found the Special 
Bank for Japan’s Annexation of Korea and aid the economic recovery of Korea 
after the war (Shibuya Reiji’s Letter to Kimijima Ichirō, November 19, 1950, 
Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents). As Shibuya largely concurred with 
Kimijima’s idea, “reentry into the Korean market” seems to have been their 
underlying goal. 
3. Executive Members and Finance
Table 1 provides the list of executives of Yūhō Kyōkai from its founding to 1970. 
While Shibuya strongly endorsed Shimomura as president of Yūhō Kyōkai since 
the very early stages of the process, Shimomura declined. Instead of Shimomura, 
Hozumi became the first president. As stated above, when Hozumi passed away 
in 1970, Kimijima Ichirō and Mizuta Naomasa succeeded as the next president 
and chairman of Yūhō Kyōkai, respectively. Except for Ogata Taketora, the early 
executive members of Yūhō Kyōkai were former directors of GGK (Hayashi 
Shigeki, Kōtaki Motoi, Hagihara Hikozō), former professors of Keijō Imperial 
University (Suzuki Takeo, Suematsu Yasukazu), former executive personnel at 
the Bank of Korea (Konishi Haruo, Shibuya Reiji), editors of Keijō Daily News 
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Table 1. The List of Executive Members of Yūhō Kyōkai (Since Its Founding to Year 1970) 





Director of Industry 
Bureau







Director of Finance 
Bureau





Director Hayashi Shigeki 
Director of Academic 
Affairs Bureau





Ken’ichi Editor of Keijō Daily News
Representative 





Chief Cabinet Director for 
Information
Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Died in 1956
Shibuya 
Reiji
Investigation Manager of 
Bank of Korea, Chairman 




Yutaka CEO of Korea Power
CEO of Nihon Kōei 
Co., Ltd. Died in 1986
Zenshō 
Eisuke GGK Commissioner





Director of Dalian Branch 
of Bank of Korea Mayor of Fukuoka
Suzuki 
Takeo
Professor at Keijō 
Imperial University
Professor at Musashi 
University Died in 1975
Shiraishi
Muneshiro
Executive Director of 
Korea Nitrogen Fertilizer





Director of Korea 
Industrial Bank
Judge, Supreme Court 
of Japan Died in 1979
Suematsu 
Yasukazu
Professor at Keijō Imperial 
University
Professor at 
Gakushūin University Died in 1992
Hagihara 
Hikozō
Governor of South 
Hamgyŏng Province, 
Vice-minister of Treasury
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Table 1. (Continued)
Position Name Prewar Occupation Postwar Occupation Note
Shioda 
Masahiro Mining Director
President of Kantō 














Managing Director of 













Director of Education 
Affairs Bureau Lawyer Died in 1970
Musha 
Renzō President of Keijō Electric
Kishi Ken Supervisor of Keijō Electric








Tōka Industry, Senior 
Managing Director of 
Korea Trade Association
President of Asahi 
Broadcasting Agency
Sakurazawa 
Shūjirō Director of Bank of Korea
Okumura 
Shigemasa
Treasurer of Finance 
Bureau
President of Nikken 
Kagaku Co., Ltd.
Source:  National Institute of Korean History Database (http;//db.history.go.kr/), Dōwa 
[Assimilation] and Keirin Kurabu kaiin meibo [The Membership List of Keirin Club] 
(November 1960) stored in Yūhō Collection (1960). Names in bold were also executive 
members of the Assimilation Association. 
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(Kondō Ken’ichi), and others Japanese repatriates who were directly or indirectly 
involved in colonial rule over Korea. 
The directors of Yūhō Kyōkai, especially former officials of the GGK, were 
mostly “bureaucrats with lifetime careers in Korea” (haenuki kanryō). They were 
mostly appointed to their positions in Korea in the 1910s, and when they 
completed their terms, many of them were reemployed by corporations related 
to the GGK.17 As the majority of directors were over sixty, new members were 
recruited among those involved in colonial Korea to fill in the vacancies when 
the senior members passed away. Shibuya was practically in charge of running 
the association since its establishment. Cabinet Secretary Ogata and Fukuoka 
Mayor Konishi joined the association upon Shibuya’s invitation.18 In this regard, 
it can be said that colonial officials and the bureaucratic orientation of Yūhō 
Kyōkai were not markedly present in its early phase. However, when Shibuya 
passed away in 1961, former directors of the GGK began to run the association: 
Hayashi Higeki (former director of the Academic Affairs Bureau) took over the 
position in 1961. Then Hagihara Hikozō (former governor of South Hamgyŏng 
Province) succeeded after Hayashi died in 1964. When Hagihara passed away in 
1967, Kōtaki Motoi (former director of Industry Bureau) took on the position. 
The former editor of Keijō Daily News Kondō Ken’ichi was in charge of editing 
the association’s publications. 
As this article found, the naming of Yūhō Kyōkai involved a political 
consideration to avoid using the term Chosŏn or Korea. While the original plan 
was to secure about ten- to twenty- million yen annually from the government 
and act as a consulting, research, and analysis group to government offices, 
including the cabinet and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the circumstances of the 
time made the plan difficult. A closer look into Director Kōtaki’s report to 
Kimijima provides a succinct portrayal of the situation. While the material is 
quite lengthy, the following is a direct quotation from the report, which is a 
valuable primary source to examine the internal affairs of Yūhō Kyōkai: 
With Hozumi’s initiative and active support from Shibuya and Kondō, the Yūhō 
Kyōkai was founded around 1950. In 1952 and 1953, a formal approval to 
establish Yūhō Kyōkai was granted from the government with the help of Ogata 
Taketora. For financial resources, Hozumi, Shibuya, and Kondō sought to raise 
17. On “bureaucrats with lifetime careers in Korea” refer to Lee Hyoung-sik (2012).
18. As his “respected friend” Shibuya asked for support, Ogata gladly accepted the request to 
become one of the founding members of Yūhō Kyōkai. Kohishi, the former director of the Dalian 
branch of the Bank of Korea, was also invited by Shibuya to join Yūhō Kyōkai (Yūhō geppō, 1952). 
Shibuya attended Waseda University with Ogata, and worked with Konishi at the Bank of Korea. 
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about one-million yen from the Osaka and Fukuoka regions. Running the 
association on this initial lump sum, with no other new sources of funds or 
profits, the financial structure of the association gradually deteriorated, making 
accounting for the association very difficult for Shibuya, who struggled with the 
issues until he passed away in his sickbed. When Hayashi Shigeki took over the 
accounting, he was quite nitpicky, as it was the only job he had at the time. 
Hayashi hardly brought any new funds to the association, and Hozumi rarely 
came to the association, due to his heart disease. When Hayashi passed away, 
Hagihara succeeded in the position and took charge of the accounting. While 
there has been no regular balancing of the association’s finances, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs requested them to submit annual reports on the association’s 
activities. Although Kudō [Sanjirō] spent months to write up the balance sheet, 
he could not finish, and gave up on the task. Kishi roughly arranged what Kudō 
had worked on and reported to the board of directors. He has been in charge of 
the accounting ever since. As Hagihara pressed for my support around 1965, I 
[Kōtaki] consulted with Uehara Kōgorō [chairman of Keidanren] for fund 
raising, and naturally I came to sign off the balance sheet. (Kōtaki Motoi’s Letter 
to Kimijima Ichirō, March 21, 1973, Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents) 
Inferable from this letter are that (1) Yūhō Kyōkai’s initial endowment 
continued to decline, as there were no new sources of funds; (2) the accounting 
of the association was poorly managed; (3) from 1965 and onwards, Chairman 
of Keidanren Uehara Kōgorō helped out in raising funds for the association. 
Yūhō Kyōkai’s Compilations on the History of Governing 
Colonial Korea 
1. The Historical Background 
Japanese repatriates from colonial Korea were not welcomed in either Korean or 
Japanese society. Koreans criticized them as the main culprits of Japan’s 
imperialist aggression against Korea, while Japanese society simultaneously 
blamed them for the atrocities committed against Koreans during the colonial 
era (Hozumi 1973). Japanese politicians also condemned the GGK as “the main 
source of Japanese militarism,” which ruled over colonial Korea at its own will. 
To further contextualize the situation, it is necessary to understand the 
atmosphere of postwar Japanese society. The condemnation of Japanese 
repatriates stemmed from the emerging discourses on Japan’s shift away from 
prewar militarism towards a “cultural” and “pacifist” nation. As the postwar 
Japanese intellectuals converged on the notion of a “cultural nation” and gained 
influence in political circles, they began to inquire into the responsibilities and 
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problems of war and colonial domination over Korea.19 
As aforementioned, the outbreak of the Korean War raised problems 
regarding the Korean residents in Japan, which, in turn, exposed the issues of 
Japan’s colonization of Korea. The armed confrontations between Korean 
residents in Japan and GHQ became ever more frequent as the Fatherland 
Defense Corps of Choryŏn expanded their influence. In particular, “Bloody May 
Day” (May), the Suita Incident (June), and the Osu Incident (July) in 1952 
highlighted the apex of the clash between GHQ and Korean residents. The Suita 
Incident occurred on June 24-25, 1952, exactly two years after the outbreak of 
Korean War. Protesters against the war and the transportation of armed goods 
clashed with Japanese police forces in Osaka. Every mainstream media outlet 
reported on the incident. They discussed the problems of Korean residents in 
Japan and argued that some of the “communist” Koreans instigated other 
Korean residents to join their riot. In 1952, the Japanese media was full of 
articles and reports about the issue of Korean residents in Japan, addressing the 
root causes of the problem, public assistance, and forced deportation issues, 
which largely converged onto the question of Japan’s colonial past and their 
domination of Korea. On this backdrop, Japanese newspapers and magazines 
turned into a fierce battleground between the left and right. 
The newspapers and magazines of the right persistently published malicious 
reports on Korean residents in Japan, outwardly expressing contempt and 
discrimination against them. For example, the Jiji Newspaper (March 24, 1951) 
argued that “as Korean residential areas are frequently becoming prone to crime, 
they are placing civilians in danger and are being used by the underground 
forces of the Communist Party. This is equivalent to keeping a ticking time 
bomb or enemy within Japanese society.” Therefore, “if possible, all remaining 
Korean residents should be deported back home.” Similarly, the Yomiuri 
Newspaper (June 27, 1952), discussing the Bloody May Day and Suita incidents, 
stated that “it is very regrettable that riots, arson, murder, and wounding are 
repeated on memorial days. Since we cannot ignore these actions, we need to 
come up with effective and appropriate measures quickly.” A series of malicious 
and provocative articles followed in the Yomiuri Newspaper, such as “Communist 
Terrorist Group Infiltrating Japan: The 30,000 Korean Residents” (March 30, 
1952), “The Identity of the Fatherland Defense Corps of North Korea Revealed: 
The 30,000 Special Forces of Blood” (July 16, 1952), and “800,000 North Korean 
Forces Infiltrating Japan, Organizing under Japanese Communist Party” (July 
19. On postwar discourses on the “cultural” and “pacifist” nation, refer to Akazawa (1995); Asano 
(2004); Jo Gwan Ja (2012).
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17, 1952). On August 7, 1952, an article entitled “Taxpayers’ Money Spent on 
Communist Koreans” criticized government spending on Korean residents’ 
living expenses, arguing that the payment was too big and that the funds were 
backfiring by protecting the “Communist Koreans,” providing funds for their 
activities. Nakamura Torata of the Japan Reform Party spoke in the plenary 
session of the House of Representatives on June 30, 1952. He stated, “Korean 
residents violating the laws of Japan and creating disorder in Japanese society 
must be deported,”20 resembling the arguments and hostility against Korean 
residents found in right wing views on the internet today. Although the tone 
and degree of statements varied, Asahi Newspaper and Mainichi Newspaper also 
frequently criticized and expressed concern over the riots instigated by North 
Korea affiliated Korean residents (“Seizei bōryoku,” 1952; “Shasetsu: Zainichi 
Chōsenjin,” 1952).21 
Given the situation, the left’s literary circles, composed of Korean residents, 
members of the New Japanese Literary Society (Shin Nihon Bungakukai), some 
conscientious Japanese who had relations with Korea, and progressive 
intellectuals and journalists, began to criticize Japan’s approach to the Korean 
resident problem, as well as Japan’s colonial past. For instance, the members of 
the New Japanese Literary Society published Democratic Korea (Minshu Chōsen), 
first issued in 1946 by Zainichi Korean writers like Kim Dal-soo and Huh Nam-
ki. They contributed numerous articles questioning Japan’s colonial past in the 
journal’s special issue for the March First Independence Movement (March/
April 1947) (Ko Yŏng-ran 2013). Tsuboi Shigeji22—publisher of New Japanese 
Literature (Shin Nihon Bungaku) and poet—published his poem “15.50 Yen” in 
New Japanese Literature in April 1948, recollecting his personal experiences and 
observations of the Korean massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake. 
Tsuboi’s questioning of the Korean massacre in the poem predated later research 
that focused on the Great Kantō Earthquake.23 Many Korean residents, 
20. Refer to Japanese parliamentary debates. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/
SENTAKU/syugiin/013/0512/01306300512063c.html. 
21. Other columns urged that a one-shot policy to solve the Zainichi Korean problems would be 
difficult, and therefore suggested a comprehensive plan for life support and protection for Zainichi 
Koreans (“Chōsenjin no mondai,” 1952).
22. Tsuboi Shigeji (1897-1975) was born in Kagawa Prefecture. When he left Waseda University, he 
joined the literary circle and was appointed as the central committee member of Japan Proletarian 
Literary Alliance (Nihon Puroretaria Bungei Renmei). In the postwar years, Tsuboi played an active 
role as a member of Japanese Communist Party, as well as the leader of the New Japanese Literary 
Society and Japanese Poet Society. 
23. On the fortieth anniversary of the Great Kantō Earthquake in 1963, protest movements 
occurred across Japan, including protests against Korea-Japan normalization. Numerous 
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intellectuals, and left wing politicians began to refer to the massacre, as they 
found the incident similar to the growing unilateral and malicious condemnation 
of Korean residents in Japan (Suzuki 1952; “Chōsenjin gyakusatus”, 1952). In his 
later publication in the Tokyo Newspaper, Tsuboi severely criticized the GGK for 
banning the use of Korean language during the colonial era. 
When novelist Yasutaka Tokuzō wrote “Literature of National Anguish” in 
the Tokyo Newspaper on March 24-25, 1952, he introduced the works by Kim 
Sa-ryang, Chang Hyŏk-ju, Aoki Hiroshi [Hong Chong-u], Kim Dal-soo, and 
others as representative Korean writers, portraying the struggles of Koreans 
under Japan’s colonial rule. The questioning of Japan’s colonial domination in 
these works predated the cluster of studies on the colonial era (imperialism) 
which began to proliferate in the 1970s.
Among the Japanese who were directly or indirectly involved with Korea—
those with friends and relatives (“Korea networks”)—also began to criticize 
Japan’s colonial rule. Korean history researcher (Koryŏ and Chosŏn Dynasties), 
Hatada Takashi,24 for instance, was born in Masan, Kyŏngnam Province of 
Korea, and published a book entitled The History of Korea in 1951 with Japan’s 
renowned publisher, Iwanami Shoten. In the introduction, Hatada argued that 
Japan’s prewar studies on Korean history had been influenced by Japan’s regional 
strategy and expressed sympathy to Koreans suffering from the Korean War. 
Hatada’s work was one of the first publications to compile Korean history from 
ancient to modern times. With the publication of the English version of the 
book, Hatada’s work became widely read. It should be noted that the work 
remained limited in that Hatada shared a similar prewar conceptual framework 
for Korea—setting the discussion within the topics of ancient Japan’s rule over 
Korea, and the assumption that Korea was culturally inferior.25 Regardless of this 
limitation, Hatada’s work criticized Japan’s colonization of Korea. Moreover, on 
July 18-19, 1952, via a column in the Tokyo Newspaper entitled “Korean Residents 
in Japan and Japanese’s Self-Reflection: Why They Left Their Motherland?,” 
Hatada appealed for a fundamental self-retrospection by the Japanese. 
Highlighting how many Korean residents first came to Japan as forced laborers 
during the colonial era to work in Japan’s businesses and war-related industries, 
investigation activities and ceremonies followed during the year. Historical Journal (Rekishi hyōron) 
released a special issue on the Great Kantō Earthquake, entitled “Nihon to Chōsen̄: Daishinsai 
Chōsenjin junan yonjū-nen ni yosete” [Japan and Korea:The Four Decades after the Great 
Earthquake and the Koreans] (1963), as well as a collection of records (Itagaki 2010, 234-35).
24. On Hatada Takashi, refer to Ko Kil-hŭi (2005).
25. On Hatada’s writings on Korean history, refer to An Jong Chol (2013). Hatada later repented for 
these kinds of works (Hatada 1989).
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Hatada argued against deporting Korean residents. During a discussion with 
Koreans and Japanese intellectuals, Hatada further mentioned that “none of the 
Japanese repatriates are commenting on the past. Although if they did speak 
out, they would probably argue that what they did was also beneficial to Korea, 
it is important to admit the atrocities committed by the Japanese. Aggressors 
should not be at peace without acknowledging their past” (“Zainichi Chōsenjin 
no zadankai,” 1952, 10-11).26 According to Hatada (1983, 287), the former 
officials of the GGK strongly reacted against Hatada’s publication of The History 
of Korea, claiming that Hatada’s negative representations of the GGK were ill-
founded. They also condemned Hatada’s column for “criticizing Japan’s good 
deeds to Korea” (“Zainichi Chōsenjin no zadankai,” 1952, 10-11). 
Lawyer Fuse Tatsuji27 was involved in various cases defending Korean 
independence activists during the colonial era. In the postwar years, Fuse 
defended Zainichi Korean activists involved in the Education Struggle, 1950 
Chōren (Choryŏn) Hall Incident, 1948 North Korean Flag Incident, and others, 
working as the advisor to the Liberty Law Group he organized. During a 
roundtable discussion organized by Central Review (Chūō kōron), Fuse argued 
that if the Japanese understood why Zainichi Koreans were brought to Japan in 
the first place and how they were treated, Japan would not be able to criticize 
their behavior. Empathizing with their fear of forced deportation and living 
under oppression, he urged the creation of policies to liberate these people (Ōya 
et al. 1952, 83). The renowned journalist Ōya Sōichi, Chinese literary scholar 
Okuno Shintarō, writer Nishino Tatsukichi, and others were also present during 
this roundtable. 
Asahi Newspaper journalist Mura Tsuneo (former director of Keijō Daily 
News, Pyŏngyang branch) wrote in Women’s Review (Fujin kōron) addressing the 
historical background of how Zainichi Koreans came to Japan. Pointing out how 
the negative perception of Korean residents at the time was influenced by 
Japanese repatriates who were seeking to regain their assets left in Korea, Mura 
urged for a critical reflection of Japan’s past. Furthermore, Mura criticized the 
fact that the discussion of Korean problems was mostly led by former officials of 
the GGK, who lacked any understanding of Zainichi Koreans’ national 
sentiments, possessing an outdated nineteenth-century ideology of imperialistic 
Japan (Mura 1952, 128; Ōya et al. 1952, 83-84).
Hosokawa Karoku (1952, 20), scholar of colonial policies and member of 
26. Yamanouchi Ichirō from the University of Tokyo and Matsuo Takashi from Waseda University 
were also present during the discussions. 
27. On the relations between Fuse Tatsuji and Zainichi Koreans in the postwar years, refer to Yi 
Hyŏng-rang (2010); Kawaguchi (2012); Mori (2014). 
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House of Councilors in the postwar years, denounced Japan’s lack of repentance 
on its past imperialism and atrocities committed against Koreans during the 
colonial era. He especially criticized Japan’s conservative party for oppressing 
the Zainichi Koreans and the socialist party for remaining silent. 
The Assimilation Association’s newsletter at the time, titled Assimilation 
(Dōwa), introduced Korea-related articles published in mainstream newspapers 
and magazines. This reveals how the former officials of the GGK remained alert 
to the growing criticisms of their past colonial rule in the Japanese media and 
intellectual circles. Former editor-in-chief of the Keijō Daily News Nakayasu 
Yosaku (1952), for instance, called the Japanese criticism of their own colonial 
past and former Japanese ruling elites as “mentally abused.” He also argued that 
these intellectuals were merely pandering to the populist discussions on Koreans 
in the media. 
However, as Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, which described 
Koreans as slaves to Japan under colonial rule, the social atmosphere of Japan 
evaded discussions that sought to justify the nation’s colonial past. Japan’s 
signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, return to international society, and 
engagement in Korea-Japan normalization talks reinforced this postwar 
tendency. The Yūhō Kyōkai strongly opposed this scenario and organized to 
compile their history of Japan’s colonial past. 
The Guidelines on the Establishment of Yūhō Kyōkai stated that the existing 
discourse treated Zainichi Koreans’ “terrorist acts” as merely “reactionary” to 
oppression in postwar Japanese society. Without questioning the foundational 
causes of their acts, The Guidelines further stated that Zainichi Koreans were 
only being allowed to seek Japan’s apology, without any self-reflection themselves 
(Zaidanhōjin Yūhō Kyōkai setsuritsu yōkō, n.d.). The Yūhō Kyōkai also criticized 
how Rhee Syngman’s anti-Japanese policies were stirring up Zainichi Koreans’ 
anti-Japanese sentiments and contempt for the Japanese colonial era, an 
argument with which some of the populist Japanese media outlets began to 
sympathize. These guidelines were explicit in revealing Yūhō Kyōkai’s strong 
distrust in the Japanese media.
Most of these discussions in the media are based not on facts, but on conclusions 
deducted from prejudices. Therefore, distortions, exaggerations, and neglect have 
become prevalent in the media to the level of propaganda, having an 
immeasurably harmful impact on the people. If left as such, it is plainly clear that 
the Japanese people will lose their pride and confidence in their country, implant a 
false conception of Japan in the world, especially to the people of East Asia, and 
thereby cause a detrimental impact on foreign relations, especially with Korean 
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nationals in the region. (Yūhō Kyōkai-shi)28 (emphasis added)
In other words, the main purpose of Yūhō Kyōkai was to compile the history 
of Japan’s colonial rule in order to “fix” the media’s “oppressive” and “exploitative” 
portrayal of the GGK during the colonial era and collect, research, analyze, and 
disseminate their own findings on their past and Korea’s problems. Keeping a 
low profile under the censorship of the GHQ and the postwar ideological 
landscape of Japanese society, the former GGK officials sought to counteract the 
“collective memory” of oppression and exploitation of the “colonized,” and 
instead substitute the “colonizers’ collective memory” of development and 
progress in Japanese society. 
2. Compiling the History of Governance
Due to financial difficulties after the founding of Yūhō Kyōkai, their publications 
were not very active. As part of their work on the Korea problem, Yūhō Kyōkai 
printed 3,000 copies of The New Reader on Korea (Shin chōsen dokuhon) in 
August 1953 and distributed or donated them to relevant government offices, 
schools, libraries, and community leaders in Japan. First published to scrutinize 
Korea-Japan historical relations and the national characteristics of the Koreans, 
The New Reader on Korea described Koreans and their history in terms of 
feudalism, backwardness, toadyism, reactiveness, identity, exclusivity, and 
ephemerality. Such portrayals indicated that the prewar Japanese ruling elites’ 
distorted and contemptuous views of Korea persisted.29 
When Korea-Japan normalization talks came to a halt with “Kubota’s 
statement” in October 1953, former GGK officials resented the attitude of 
Korean delegates and urged fundamental countermeasures to deal with the 
Korea problem and their colonial past. Considering the Rhee Syngman regime’s 
anti-Japanese sentiment, these former officials were pessimistic about the 
prospect of signing a normalization treaty with Korea at the time, and instead 
waited for a turning point in Korea, such as regime change. Hozumi believed 
that “nothing can change if we only talk amongst ourselves and do not speak 
out. Yet, if we blindly believe in the rightness of our actions and fight, we will 
28. It is an unpublished document stored at the Yūhō Collection. The author and the year of 
creation are unknown.
29. Additionally, conservative polemicist Nagoshi Futaranosuke described The New Reader on 
Korea as “a good book that is respectful of Japan’s position,” when introducing the book to 
Japanese students visiting Korea (Nagoshi Futaranosuke’s Letter to Kishi Ken, September 11, 1967, 
Yūhō Collection). 
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only fool ourselves by showing them our flaws first, which will backfire on us.” 
On these grounds, Hozumi sought to compile documents and data on their 
colonial past while waiting for the right time when their past deeds could be 
“fairly” evaluated (Hozumi Shinrokurō’s Letter to Kōtaki Motoi, June 25, 1965, 
Kōtaki 1972). As illustrated below, Hozumi’s ideas were materialized into the 
plans to compile the history of Korea’s industrial development and establish an 
archive of documents on Korea in 1954. 
First, Suzuki Takeo, Funada Kyōji, and other former faculty of Keijō Imperial 
University participated in compiling the history of Korea’s industrial development. 
The purpose was to illuminate how Japan’s rule had been critical in Korea’s 
remarkable leap in industrial development (Tanaka and Hozumi 1954). Put 
differently, they sought to refute the emerging thesis that all colonial domination 
is aggressive and exploitative. At the same time, Yūhō Kyōkai prepared to publish 
an “accurate history” of Japan’s colonial rule (beginning with industrial 
development). As a joint project with the Central Japanese-Korean Association, 
Yūhō Kyōkai planned to reorganize the association’s Yamagata Collection and 
Hashi Colletion, compile data on their colonial rule, and publish and reinterpret 
valuable relevant materials. Under the title of “Data Collection and Compilation 
Plan of Colonial Rule over Korea,” Yūhō Kyōkai launched its initiative to begin 
the joint program, with costs totaling seventy-two-million yen. In March 1955, 
they began the first phase of the plan—fundraising. Director Kimijima, 
inaugurated in October 1954 with the help of director Hayashi Shigeki, sought 
to raise funds from the Bank of Japan, Japan’s First Bank, Tokyo Bankers 
Association (Tokyo Ginkō Kyōkai), Fuji Bank, Sanwa Bank, Yamaichi Securities, 
and others. However, as “there were still no responses from the government,” 
fundraising remained as a major challenge to Yūhō Kyōkai. According to the 
1954 proposal to launch the history compilation project on Korea’s industrial 
Table 2. Total Donations to Yūhō Kyōkai
*Unit: 10,000 yen
Year 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Amount  35  150 No Data Available 130 137 55 175 181
Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Amount  181  161  295  401 205 348 428 600 465 860
Year 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Amount  400  115  20  10 20 214 360 370 354 435
*Source: Yūhō Kyōkai-shi (n.d.). Amount below 10,000 were rounded up. 
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Table 3. Main Publications by Yūhō Kyōkai
Title Author Year
New Reader on Korea Kondō Ken’ichi 1953
References on the History of Korea’s Development in 
Fiscal and Monetary Systems Kondō Ken’ichi 1956
Annexation and Protection of Korea Kondō Ken’ichi 1956
Records on the Government General of Korea at the End 
of the War Yamana Mikio 1956
Collection of Important Documents on Korean 
Electricity 
Kishi Ken and Kondō 
Ken’ichi 1958
Overview of Korea’s Public Works Shinba Kōhei 1959
Collection of Contemporary Research on the Modern 
History of Korea (1) 
Association for Research on 
Korea Records 1959
Collection of Contemporary Research on the Modern 
History of Korea (2)
Association for Research on 
Korea Records 1959
Collection of Contemporary Research on the Modern 
History of Korea (3)
Association for Research on 
Korea Records 1960
Collection of Contemporary Research on the Modern 
History of Korea (4)
Association for Research on 
Korea Records 1961
History of Korean Agriculture: Policy Kobayakawa Kurō, ed. 1959
History of Korean Agriculture: Development Kobayakawa Kurō, ed. 1959
History of Korean Agriculture: Data Kobayakawa Kurō, ed. 1960
History of Korean Land Improvement Projects Furushō Itsuo 1960
Korea and Taiwan during the Pacific War Kondō Ken’ichi 1961
Governing Failing Korea during the Pacific War Kondō Ken’ichi 1961
List of Literature and Documents Related to Korea Kondō Ken’ichi 1961
Analysis on Governing Korea and Its End through Fiscal 
and Financial Policy
Mizuta Naomasa and 
Tsuchiya Takao 1962
Korea during the Pacific War (1) Kondō Ken’ichi 1962
Korea during the Pacific War (2) Kondō Ken’ichi 1963
Korea during the Pacific War (3) Kondō Ken’ichi 1963
Korea during the Pacific War (4) Kondō Ken’ichi 1963
Korea during the Pacific War (5) Kondō Ken’ichi 1964
Korea Manse Incident (March First Independence 
Movement) (1) Kondō Ken’ichi 1964
Korea Manse Incident (March First Independence 
Movement) (2) Kondō Ken’ichi 1964
Korea Manse Incident (March First Independence 
Movement) (3) Kondō Ken’ichi 1964
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development, the donations accrued at Yūhō Kyōkai increased from 350,000 yen 
to 1.5 million yen. Nevertheless, as aforementioned, even the annual reports for 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were cursorily prepared, as Yūhō Kyōkai paid 
little attention to accounting at the time. Fiscal reports became available only by 
1959, and funds began to increase after 1962 (see table 2).
The main purpose for founding the archive of documents on Korea was for 
Yūhō Kyōkai to actively respond to the growing “historicization” tendency of 
Japanese interpretation of the nation’s colonial past, and pursue a more realistic 
and justifiable—according to their views—conception of Korea. They sought to 
collect and categorize both old and new literature, documents, and data on 
Korea and provide the materials to researchers. 
Table 3 is the list of Yūhō Kyōkai’s publications from its founding to 1964. 
These Yūhō publications enabled Hozumi to enact his plan to compile a history 
of Korea’s industrial development. In 1955, Yūhō Kyōkai planned to publish The 
History of Korea’s Fiscal and Financial Development with Suzuki Takeo, drawing 
upon the experiences of former GGK officials. The References on the History of 
Korea’s Development in Fiscal and Monetary Systems, listed in table 3, was 
published in preparation for this project. The publication of this material had 
been financed by over ten banks, including the Bank of Japan, Japan’s First 
Bank, Fuji Bank, Sanwa Bank, and others (“Yūhō Kyōkai no jigyō ni tsuite” [On 
Yūhō Kyōkai’s Businesses], attached to Shibuya Reiji’s Letter to Kimijima Ichirō, 
March 19, 1957, Yūhō Collection). The third publication listed in table 3, 
Annexation and Protection of Korea, was distributed to Japanese government 
offices, libraries, and other general archives. As Yūhō Kyōkai viewed the material 
as an “essential reference” to understand the Korea problem, the main purpose 
of this publication was to refute the Korean position during the Korea-Japan 
normalization talks that the annexation of Korea was illegal. Yūhō’s publications 
until 1964 were mostly duplications of former documents of the GGK and rarely 
included direct records or descriptions of the GGK officials’ actual experiences. 
3. The Publication of the Yūhō Series
The publications of Yūhō Kyōkai proliferated in 1965 as Korea and Japan 
normalized relations. When Forty Years of Manchuria Development was 
published in 1964, the members of Yūhō Kyōkai decided on the need to publish 
The History of Ruling Taiwan and The History of the Government General of 
Korea. However, Yūhō Kyōkai decided to postpone their original plan to publish 
their History of the Government General of Korea for another 100 years. Finding 
it more urgent to actually collect and organize the vast amount of empirical 
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data, Yūhō Kyōkai began instead to focus on publishing the Yūhō Series, which 
compiled voice and written recordings of the people directly and indirectly 
involved in Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. When Korea and Japan finally 
normalized relations, Yūhō Kyōkai sought to use the momentum to discuss 
prospective projects for the association and search for new funds to run these 
programs. Kimijima, for instance, went to a party hosted by the president of the 
Bank of Japan on April 1, 1966, and submitted Yūhō Kyōkai-related documents, 
asking for donations from President Usami Makoto and Vice President Sasaki 
Tadashi (Kimijima Ichirō’s Diary, April 1, 1966, Kimijima Ichirō-Related 
Documents). Yūhō Kyōkai sought to increase their funds with their personnel 
connections in the Bank of Japan and throughout economic and political 
spheres across Japan.30 After Yūhō Kyōkai received a subsidy of one-million yen 
from the government in March 1968, President of Japan-Korea Economic 
Association Uehara Kōgorō (president of Keidanren),31 Vice President Andō 
Toyoroku, and other Korea related Japanese corporations formed a support 
organization for the Yūhō Kyōkai in July of that year.32 The Japan-Korea 
Economic Association had been founded by President of Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry Adachi Tadashi, Vice President of Keidanren Uemura, 
and Zainichi Korean businessmen Sŏ Kap-ho and Yu Kang-u in December 1960 
to facilitate the normalization of Korea-Japan relations and economic exchanges.33 
30. According to Hozumi’s report in July 1968, the Yūhō Kyōkai accumulated a total of 4.31 million 
yen since April 1967 from the following sources: Kajima Coporation (300,000 yen), Nishimatsu 
Construction (300,000 yen), Sumitomo Real Estate (200,000 yen), Bank of Korea Tokyo Branch 
(10,000 yen), Shimizu Corporation (100,000 yen), Tokyo Bankers Association with sixteen banks 
in total (1.5 million yen), Yasushi Electric (50,000 yen), Yawata Steel (100,000 yen), Nihon Kōei 
(100,000 yen), Japan Airlines (50,000 yen), cabinet secretary (one-million yen), TEPCO (200,000 
yen), and Fuji Steel Corporation (100,000 yen). 
31. Uehara visited Korea in 1962 as the head of the economic mission and agreed with Park 
Chung-hee to collaborate on his regime’s First Five-Year Economic Development Plan. As Uehara 
became president of the Japan-Korea Economic Association, he also came to serve as the bridge 
between the Japanese and Korean economic circles (Uehara Kōgorō Denkishitsu 1979, 320-21).
32. The founding members of the association include: Uehara Kōgorō, Andō Toyoroku (president, 
Onoda Cement Co., Ltd.), Egashira Yutaka (Chisso Corporation), Kajima Morinosuke (Kajima 
Corporation), Kubota Yutaka (chairman, Nihon Kōei Co., Ltd.), Dokō Toshio (president, Tokyo 
Shibaura Electric Co., Ltd.), Nakajima Masaki (president, Mitsubishi Steel Corporation), Nakayasu 
Shūichi (president, Ube Industries, Ltd.), Nagano Shigeo (president, Fuji Steel Corporation), 
Hasegawa Jūsaburō (president, Daichi Bank Ltd.), Fujii Ryōgo (vice president, Yahata Steel 
Corporation), Hoshino Kiyoji (chairman of Real Estate Bank), Matsuo Shizuma (president, Nihon 
Airport Co., Ltd.), Matsuyama Mosuke (chairman, Sapporo Beer Co., Ltd.), Miyazaki Kagayaki 
(president, Asahi Chemical Industry Co., Ltd.), and Yoshikawa Seiichi (president, Shimizu 
Corporation).
33. Refer to Nit-Kan Keizai Kyōkai (1991, 26); Yanagimachi (2010, 25-26); Kimura (1989). 
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To provide information on Korea to its members, the Japan-Korea Economic 
Association published regular periodicals, such as the News Bulletin and 
Monthly Reports. While Keidanren asked for more practical research on the 
situation in Korea for Japanese businesses to evaluate their prospects for 
re-entry into the Korean market, Yūhō Kyōkai prioritized publishing materials 
on their past colonial rule. They planned to receive a 50,000-yen donation from 
each prominent businessman. In specific, the Yūhō Kyōkai raised funds from the 
Tokyo Bankers Association with the help of Mizuta, as well as from the 
Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan via Uehara’s connections. 
Inferable from these donations by the private sector is that many Japanese 
businesses supported Yūhō Kyōkai’s publications, mainly to create a favorable 
environment for them to re-enter the Korean market. Their business incentives 
converged around Yūhō Kyōkai’s goal of replacing the “exploitative and 
repressive” portrayal of Japan’s colonial past with a more benign emphasis on the 
“development and progress” that Japanese rule brought to Korea.
When Hozumi passed away in May 1970, Mizuta was endorsed as the next 
president of Yūhō Kyōkai. However, Mizuta declined, and the board promoted 
Kimijima as the head of directors and Mizuta as vice-head of directors. Yet, as 
Mizuta continued to decline the endorsements, the board finally settled on 
Kimijima as the next president and Mizuta as chairman of Yūhō Kyōkai. This 
process involved revising the original memorandum of the association and 
enlarging the total number of directors and members. The inauguration of 
Kimijima and Mizuta, who had influential connections in Japan’s business 
circles, allowed Yūhō Kyōkai to increase their funds significantly and run their 
programs more stably than before. In 1971, a second support association was 
formed to raise funds of up to eighteen-million yen for the next three years. 
According to a letter sent to their founding members in June 1973, Yūhō Kyōkai 
emphasized “how Japan’s postwar publishing and media circles are becoming 
predominated by leftists who consistently portray Japan’s colonial past as 
oppressive and exploitative of Korea. Since we cannot ignore a situation in 
which incorrect history is being taught, Yūhō Kyōkai was founded to pass down 
history in its entirety through firsthand materials and recordings of the 
experiences of individuals involved in both the private and public sectors during 
Japan’s rule of Korea.” From 1971 to 1973, Yūhō Kyōkai accrued a total of 19.25 
million yen, far exceeding the original amount proposed. When Kimijima 
passed away in 1975, Yūhō Kyōkai’s fundraising efforts became dormant. 
However, once Mizuta replaced Kimijima as the next president, the fundraising 
began to pick up again. 
Starting from 1966, thirty titles of the “Research on Historical Records of 
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Modern Korea: Yūhō Series” were published. While the Yūhō publications until 
1964 were mostly duplicates of the original documents from the GGK, the 
publications after 1966 were distinguishable by the direct records of former 
officials’ testimonies on governing Korea. This Yūhō Series was distributed to 
universities and public libraries in Japan and abroad to refute the growing 
criticism of their colonial rule among Japanese intellectual, media, and cultural 
circles. 
Specifically, the first and second titles of the Yūhō Series (“Research on 
Korea’s Land” and “Korean Rice and Japan’s Food Shortage Problem”) were 
published to refute Hatada Takashi’s criticisms of the GGK’s Land Inquiry 
Project and Rice Crop Production Enhancement Plan. The third title (“Korean 
Language Education in Korea under Japan’s Colonial Rule”) was intended to 
refute Tsuboi Shigeji’s critique of the GGK’s Korean language ban. As the former 
officials considered Korea-Japan normalization as the final “seal” or settlement 
to the problem of Japan’s responsibility of colonizing Korea, they no longer 
suppressed their views of their past. Yūhō Kyōkai began to directly challenge the 
perception of renowned scholars. On a television program in October 1966, 
Inoki Masamichi, professor of law at Kyoto University, and Prime Minister Satō 
Eisaku mentioned how the GGK banned Korean language education and 
oppressed Koreans during the colonial era. Yūhō Kyōkai responded by sending 
them their Yūhō Series (Kawase Osamu’s Letter to Kōtaki Motoi, October 3, 
1966, Yūhō Collection). When Yanaihara Isaku—philosopher and eldest son of 
Yanaihara Tadao—published an article in the Japanese Economic Newspaper 
(Nihon keizai shinbun) on March 16, 1967, mentioning compiling a Korean 
dictionary, Hozumi sent the following letter to Yanaihara: 
Your discussion of a “Korean dictionary” in the column you published in the 
corner of “Tomorrow’s Issue” in the Japanese Economic Newspaper on March 16, 
1967, greatly lacks understanding of the issue. It is regrettable to see such an 
influential figure like yourself write such a column in the media. Although 
Japan’s colonial rule over Korea was, at times, excessive during the Second World 
War (which has to be considered in the context of Japan’s political situation), the 
main purpose of the GGK was always to develop Korea’s culture and economy to 
the level of Japan. … There was no ban of the use of Korean nor enforced use of 
Japanese. … Please read the attached “Korean Language Education in Korea 
under Japan’s Colonial Rule,” and I hope you can change your perception. 
(Hozumi Shinrokurō’s Letter to Yanaihara Isaku, March 20, 1967, Yūhō 
Collection) (emphasis added)
As Hozumi pointed out, a Korean dictionary was already published by the 
GGK in the 1920s. However, although he knew that Japan banned the use of 
 Postwar Compilations on the History of Governing by the Japanese Ruling Elites  155
Korean and enforced Japanese during the Japanization policy period, these 
statements reveal Hozumi’s efforts to conceal facts that were disadvantageous to 
them. As illustrated, the Yūhō Series was devised to “fix” the conception of 
Japanese intellectuals who were largely “ignorant” on Japan’s colonial past. 
Conclusion
This article examined the background and the process of establishment of Yūhō 
Kyōkai, and its compilation projects on the history on Japan’s colonial rule over 
Korea from the point of view of former GGK officials. 
Postwar Japanese society sought to erase the memories of the nation’s 
colonial past after their defeat in the war. However, as the colonial problem of 
Korean residents in Japan lingered, along with the outbreak of the Korean War, 
the so-called “Korea problem” emerged as an important issue in Japanese 
society. It was against this backdrop that the past ruling elites of the colonial era 
organized into Yūhō Kyōkai with the support of repatriated Japanese corporations 
and Korea-related firms.
As the Fatherland Defense Forces of Choryŏn sought to expand their 
influence after the outbreak of the Korean War, Japanese newspapers and 
magazines became a fierce battleground between the left and right on the 
problem of Korean residents and Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. The newspapers 
and magazines of the right consistently spread malicious reports on Koreans in 
Japan and outwardly expressed their contempt and discrimination against them. 
In response, the left literary circles composed of Korean residents, members of 
the New Japanese Literary Society, some conscientious Japanese who had 
relations with Korea, and progressive intellectuals and journalists began to 
criticize Japan’s approach to Korean resident problems in Japan, as well as Japan’s 
colonial past. The former officials of the GGK who had been keeping a low 
profile under the GHQ’s censorship and postwar Japanese society, which sought 
to shift from prewar militarism towards a “cultural” and “pacifist” Japan, began 
to challenge the “collective memory” of oppression and exploitation of the 
“colonized.” Instead, they disseminated the “colonizers’ collective memory” of 
development and progress in Japanese society. With the support of Japan’s 
economic circles, including the Japan-Korea Economic Association, which 
sought to regain their market in Korea, the Yūhō Kyōkai established historical 
archives on the colonial era (Yūhō Collection, Historical Records on the Rule 
over Korea, Yūhō Series, etc.). These were efforts to historicize the collective 
memories of colonizers. Among the former GGK officials, the 1965 Korea-Japan 
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normalization agreement was a final settlement on the issues surrounding 
Japan’s responsibilities for colonizing Korea. With this occasion and Japan’s rapid 
economic growth at the time, these collective memories of former colonial 
officials evolved into public memories, significantly influencing Japan’s postwar 
conception of the colonial era.
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